

PERSONAL PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM: THE MISSING LINK IN UNITED STATES ARMY FORCE PROTECTION

**A MONOGRAPH
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
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
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This monograph found that in both Beirut and Saudi Arabia, terrorist activity indicators were spotted prior to these attacks, but were neither recognized nor reported. This monograph concludes that because the Army is becoming increasingly involved in situations similar to those of Beirut and Saudi Arabia, it presents a correspondingly more lucrative target for terrorism. Further, because terrorism is a threat to U.S. national policy, the Army must develop a doctrine to integrate the soldier into the fight against terrorism *before* the attack occurs. This new doctrine must increase the soldier's situational awareness of activities around him, and educate him as to where and how to report these observations. Only then will the Army take steps in the direction of reducing soldier vulnerability in an increased terrorist threat environment.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Terror is commonly regarded as synonymous with fear, anxiety, panic or horror. On close examination, however, terror is more than simply fear, it implies prolonged and intense fear. In the same vein, terrorism is an artificial, man-made production or application of terror.¹

Terrorism is not new. For centuries, armies tried to strike terror into the hearts of their enemy. The main reason for this was that a terrified enemy would fight poorly, or simply not fight at all; it was a way to modify the behavior of the enemy before the battle occurred in order to affect the outcome.²

The origins of terrorism are lost in history.³ In essence, terrorism began when humans discovered that people could be influenced by intimidation.⁴ One of the earliest known terrorist groups was the Jewish Zealots. The Zealots attempted to fight against the oppressive rule of Rome⁵ and to enforce their views of ethnic and religious purity by killing those they identified as doing "evil".⁶ These "evil doers" were not only members of their opposition, but also their own people who did not fully conform with the Zealot's views. Ultimately the Zealot's campaign failed because their actions split Jewish society and provided the Romans with an excuse to conquer and dominate the Jewish society.⁷

More recently, the modern era of terrorism can be attributed to the Anarchist movement in Europe during the late nineteenth century. During this period, the Anarchist sought the destruction of all existing governments and the abolition of private property. The Anarchists' method of accomplishing this was through acts of "propaganda of the deed"; which was a knife, revolver or bomb employed in an act of

terrorism. Eventually the passions of the Anarchist movement were subdued by its movement into the syndicates and into the trade unions, which were more realistic in their approach to causing social and economic change.⁸

Terrorism in the twentieth century did not end with the Anarchists. In the 1920's and 1930's the Palestinian conflict began, which ushered in another era of terrorism. When the Jewish people began moving into Palestine, which they regarded as their God given home, it caused great conflict with the Arabs who lived in, and with the British who controlled the region. Both the Arabs and Jews had nationalistic hopes and resorted to terrorism as a means of trying to obtain their goals. As a result of the regional strife, and the end of World War Two, the United Nations partitioned Palestine in 1947, creating what is current day Israel. This partition has been a source of conflict ever since.

Terrorism became a visible problem for the United States in the 1970's and 1980's. During this period many groups and nation-states employed terrorism as a tool to attack U.S. interests so as to alter U.S. national policy. Many of these terrorists' acts came from middle-eastern nations who view the U.S. as the evil power from the West. The 1979 Iran hostage crisis, the Marine Barracks bombing in 1983, the Flight 103 bombing in 1989, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and most recently, the 1996 bombing of the U.S. Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia are clear examples of these terrorist attacks.

During the period from 1972 to 1991, there were no less than 145 terrorist incidents conducted against DoD affiliated personnel and installations abroad.⁹ It seems

clear that the threat of terrorism is not going away; and, more important, it is moving into the domestic front, where Americans, especially military personnel, have traditionally felt safe.¹⁰

Currently terrorists have an increased ability to become a global menace. They now have more access to machine guns, bombs, and most importantly, the mass media. The technological advances in weapons and communications make terrorism much more affective than in the days of daggers, gunpowder and poison.¹¹

CURRENT U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

U.S. Army doctrines are principles which guide Army forces in support of national objectives.¹² Current U.S. Army tactical doctrine prescribes little, if anything, for the tactical commander to help him combat terrorism, beyond defining the term and insisting that it is a threat.¹³ Although FM 100-20, Stability and Support Operations (Final Draft) does include a chapter on the subject, it does no better than other doctrinal manuals at offering the commander a "how to" for prevention.

The Department of State (DOS) has the lead for determining antiterrorism measures abroad, however, commanders still have an inherent responsibility to protect their soldiers and facilities from attack.¹⁴ Intelligence and counter-intelligence are the first line of defense in an antiterrorism program.¹⁵ Combating terrorism requires knowledge of terrorist's goals, intentions, and capabilities, and an active intelligence program.¹⁶

Because a terrorist attack can come from any direction, tactical commanders do not have the intelligence infrastructure to cover their entire area of interest, especially

while conducting other military operations. Most terrorist attacks are preceded by a long surveillance of the proposed target to obtain critical information and determine the value of the target¹⁷ which can be an advantage to the commander if he is able to employ his forces appropriately.

Meticulous physical observation, coupled with awareness, education, and intelligence are the keys to defeating terrorists.¹⁸ If the tactical commander can arm his soldiers with the detailed knowledge of individual protective measures¹⁹ and have his soldiers report suspicious activities to intelligence authorities who can fuse the information into patterns of activity; the commander can successfully deter a terrorist attack. To do this soldiers must be trained to spot surveillance and to know to whom to report the incident.²⁰

In order to affect this training, tactical commanders must have a doctrine with training principles to train soldiers on what to look for. Intelligence organizations cannot do it all. Soldiers must be trained to overtly collect information in all of their activities and report suspicious activities. They must understand all aspects of terrorism and how seemingly innocent information can help.²¹

A comprehensive antiterrorism program can prevent many terrorist attacks. To accomplish this, the program must explain the nature of the threat to the soldier, tell him what activities to look for, listen when he reports, and provide continuous feedback to the soldier.

PRINCIPLE RESEARCH QUESTION

The United States Army has spent significant time and resources developing a superb counter-terrorist force; but for a counter-terrorist force to be employed, the act of terrorism must have already taken place. The current problem is that the Army does not have a service wide doctrine that would help protect the soldier and integrate him into the fight to prevent terrorist acts.

The principle research question of this monograph will be: "Should The United States Army Develop A Personal Protection Doctrine Against Terrorism ?"

MONOGRAPH METHODOLOGY

The Methodology of the monograph will be first to define the key terms and concepts which are applicable to terrorism so as to have an agreed-upon set of definitions, which are essential to understanding the problems being addressed. Second, the monograph will explain how a terrorist uses violence to achieve his desired goals. In this section, the monograph will explain why terror is used, as opposed to other methods of warfare; how terrorist groups are organized; what tactics terrorists use; and what constitutes a "lucrative" terrorist target. Third, the monograph will examine the concept of the extended battlefield by using historical case studies to explain the extended battlefield concept and to show how this type warfare is employed in today's world. Fourth, the monograph will review the significance terrorism has had on U.S. policy, again, through the examination of historical case studies. Finally, the monograph will analyze the previous three chapter's conclusions to determine whether the Army is a lucrative target for terrorism, whether the Army can be affected by the extended

battlefield, and whether the threat of terrorism is a significant enough threat to the Army for the Army to focus on it. The monograph will conclude with a brief recommendation as to what action, if any, the Army should take.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMINOLOGY

Force protection, terrorism, anti-terrorism and other associated terms are commonly misused and misunderstood among civilians, the media, and military personnel. "Terrorism is like pornography: everyone has a general impression of what it is without agreeing on a detailed definition."²² Due to the nature and purpose of this monograph, Department of Defense definitions will be used in order to provide an agreed upon reference set.

Force Protection is defined as "a security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs."²³

Terrorism is defined as the "calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."²⁴

Political terrorism is the "use or threat of use, of violence, by an individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and /or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger

than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into conceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.”²⁵

Counterterrorism is the “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.”²⁶ U.S. counterterrorism programs are classified.²⁷

Antiterrorism is the “defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorists acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.”²⁸

Antiterrorism Awareness is the “fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorism.”²⁹ Antiterrorism Awareness is, in essence, situational awareness.

Sabotage is an “act of malicious damage used by terrorists to achieve a physiological impact.”³⁰ In sabotage, the death of people is not required to achieve the goal of establishing vulnerability of the target audience, however, it significantly adds to the psychological effect.

II. TERRORIST METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

In order to successfully combat an enemy, one must have an understanding of the organization, methodology, tactics, and objectives of that enemy. The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the motivations, organization, rationale, and tactics of terrorists to determine whether the terrorist threat is worthy of doctrinal consideration by the Army.

Terrorism is not senseless, mindless or irrational.³¹ Terrorists use the terror that they produce as a deliberate means to an end. These objectives, however, are usually obscured by the fact that the acts appear random and hurt innocent people.³² The casual observer may not be immediately aware of the political objective.

The success of individual acts of terrorism lies in the fact that the terrorist holds a monopoly on the principle of war - offense. He is able to determine when, where, and how the attack will take place.³³ An individual terrorist act, properly planned and executed, has virtually no defense at the point of attack.

To obtain his objectives, the terrorist does his homework. He understands his target and his target audience both at the cultural and political level. He understands that all people have different thresholds of fear based on their personal and cultural backgrounds³⁴ and he uses his knowledge of the audiences' fear to create the images that will have the desired effect.

The tactics and target selection of a terrorist group is normally a function of that group's affiliation, training level, organization and sophistication. Accordingly, security forces categorize terrorist groups according to their operational traditions: national, transnational, or international. National groups operate within the boundaries of a single nation. Transnational groups operate in two or more nations and are usually assumed to receive direction and support from a foreign government. International groups operate in two or more nations and are usually assumed to receive direction and support from a foreign government.³⁵

Another categorization of terrorist groups is determined by their level of government affiliation. The first of these categories is the non-state-supported group, which operates independent of government direction and receives little, if any support. The second group is the state-supported group, which operates independent of government control, but receives state support from one or more governments. The third group is the state-directed group. These terrorists operate as an agent of the government and receive substantial support in the form of intelligence, logistics and funding.³⁶ These categories are useful to planners to help them anticipate target selection and determine the level of threat.

Individual terrorists can be categorized by three typologies: crazies, criminals and crusaders.³⁷ The crazies are those terrorists who are mentally and emotionally disturbed. Their acts of terror are likely to be related to the mental disorder of which they suffer and are the most dangerous since they act randomly and have no pattern from which to predict. The second typology is the criminal, who may act as a terrorist during the commission of a crime, such as taking a hostage or as part of an organized crime syndication using coercion and intimidation. The third category is the crusader. The crusaders typically see themselves in service to a great cause, with the intent of achieving a collective goal. These terrorists are the most numerous and are the most significant threat to military targets. Their acts are generally considered political in nature and thus could be expected to use a military target to achieve a political goal.³⁸ While they are all a threat, the crusader will be the focus for terrorist events for this monograph because they include the consequences of politically motivated acts of terror and violence.³⁹

TERRORISM VS. CONVENTIONAL WAR

While many people mistakenly view terrorism as simply criminal act, the acts conducted by political terrorist groups are political and thus are a "continuation of policies by other means."⁴⁰ These groups use terror as a weapon because they simply feel that they have no other means available to them.

War is not cheap. One of the greatest challenges of conventional war today is the cost. For example, an aircraft carrier battle group costs approximately one billion dollars before it hits the water,⁴¹ and coalition forces in the 1990-1991 Gulf War were underwritten by many of the world's economic powers.

By comparison, terrorism is a bargain. It allows a weak nation to challenge a strong nation, and it is low risk, and effective.⁴² One person, properly trained and motivated, can conduct a well-planned terrorist attack⁴³ that will have the political victory of an entire army operation, at comparatively no cost. Terrorism provides the underdog a method of expressing political power that would otherwise have been impossible.⁴⁴ In Lebanon in 1983, it took a few thousand dollars worth of explosives to modify the correlation of power between the U.S. and the Lebanese factions.⁴⁵

In addition to being inexpensive, terrorism is extremely useful in putting a demand for political change on the public agenda. A terrorist act can publicize the political agenda of a terrorist group to the world through the media, free of charge.⁴⁶

Although terrorism does not require the sophistication of a modern army to be effective, terrorist techniques have become quite sophisticated. Today, terrorists have money and technology that they did not enjoy in anarchist times.⁴⁷ Because of this

increase in sophistication, governments are forced to spend a great deal of resources on protective measures for their facilities.⁴⁸

WHY TERRORISM IS EFFECTIVE

The disparity of power in the modern world makes terrorism a good weapon for the underdog. Its symbolic destruction or control of power is a vital tool to generate non-military political pressure.⁴⁹ Viewed from the terrorist's standpoint, terrorism is simply a reasonable way of pursuing extreme interests in the political arena.⁵⁰

Unlike conventional war, where an army may have only a few legal targets, the terrorist is not limited by a conventional battlefield. He has the ability to seek out low risk targets that will suit his needs by providing publicity. Terrorists will seldom attack a properly defended target, they will seek out the "soft target" that will attain their objective. Because the terrorist is not constrained by the law of land warfare, his multiplicity of targets lends to his success.⁵¹ The terrorist remains unconstrained by rules of engagement, distinguishing between soldiers and civilians, or being identified by uniform. These "irregular troops" are of great concern to the military commander because they are difficult to defend against on a conventional basis.

It is common knowledge that terrorism is an emotional event more than a physical event and that a terrorist must exploit the event once it happens.⁵² As such, "Terrorism and mass media are made for each other; they would have to invent each other if the other did not already exist."⁵³ Because the terrorists' goal is to frighten and control, they are actually playing for a target audience. They must incite that target audience into action for their political ends to be met.⁵⁴ Two of the greatest advantages that a modern

day terrorist has over his forefathers is the worldwide increase in literacy and the proliferation of radio and television to the general population.⁵⁵ A relatively new tool at the terrorists' disposal is the proliferation of the World Wide Web, or Internet which can provide vast advertisement for his cause and readily available communications.

TERRORIST GROUP ORGANIZATION

Although terrorism is an inexpensive and effective means to conduct war, it is not easy to bring together people with many motivational factors. In order for a terrorist group to survive, it must have effective leadership and dedicated followers within the group. Additionally, it must have dedicated followers outside of the group to provide above ground support such as intelligence collection and fund raising.⁵⁶

At the top level is the hard-core leadership. These persons are typically educated, charismatic and upper-class. This upper echelon may or may not take part in the tactical operations of the group. Generally, except during formative stages, they prefer to use other members for "missions".⁵⁷

At the second tier of command is the active cadre, which are the real doers of the group. These people conduct attacks, assassinations and bombings as well as intelligence collection. At this level the sociopaths and people suffering from inadequate personality development are found.⁵⁸ These are the "true believers".⁵⁹

External to the terrorist group are the supporters. These people are not actually members of the group but are sympathetic to the advertised cause and will go to various extremes to support the groups actions. These supporters are essential to the success of the terrorist group, and are also divided into two tiers.⁶⁰

The first level of supporters are known as the active supporters. These people interact with the leadership and cadre and are aware of the true nature of the group. They may publish papers, rent safe houses, collect intelligence and provide logistical support. In this group are doctors who treat members on the run, lawyers who represent members in court, and organizers who either overtly or covertly collect money for the organization.⁶¹

The second level of supporters are known as the passive supporters who support the advertised cause but do not get involved in criminal activity. They will lend cars and houses with a "blind eye", contribute money, and collect information in support of the intelligence effort of the advertised cause.⁶²

TERRORIST GROUP STRUCTURE

A typical terrorist group is structured along the lines of a military organization. They have commands and subordinate commands and specialty sections to conduct specific missions.

The command element is comprised of the hard-core leadership who typically do not take part in conducting tactical operations. They are the level leadership and usually manage the money.⁶³ Subordinate commands have the same duties, on lower levels.

The intelligence section acts as the S-2 or G-2 in a military organization, although there may be several compartmented sections at any level of command. They collect information on potential targets and make recommendations to the leadership on precise target selection.⁶⁴

The logistics section is the S-4 or G-4 equivalent. They obtain the safe houses, food, ammunition, weapons, and explosives. They usually interact with the active supporters for materials and funds. There may be several logistics sections at each level of command, and they may also be compartmented.⁶⁵

The tactical section is the element that actually conducts the terrorists attacks and is the home of the assassin, bomber, kidnapper and hi-jacker. These elements may be housed in safe houses or in terrorist training camps. This organization may be a standing unit, or can be an ad-hoc unit comprised of intelligence and support members brought together for a specific mission.⁶⁶

Within a terrorist group the sub-command dynamics, egos, and philosophical differences can cause splinter groups, or factions, to form out of the larger organization. This is one of the leading causes of the increase in the number of terrorist organizations. Generally speaking, these splinter groups are more violent than the parent group.⁶⁷

TERRORIST GOALS

There are several different goals that a terrorist organization may pursue and many different ways to effect the required terror. Understanding the goals of a terrorist group is essential to thwarting the group attacks.

The first major goal of terrorism is publicizing its cause. The maturity and focus the group has determines whether the target audience is its own population or the international community, or both.⁶⁸

The second major goal of terrorism is called "coercive diplomacy". The terrorist group wants to harass, intimidate and make life hard for the authorities. This goal's objective is to deprive the opposition of resources, law and order, and piece of mind.⁶⁹

The third major goal of terrorism is the polarization of society. The terrorist group assumes that they can create a status quo versus a non-status quo and that the anti-status quo (aligned with the terrorists) will be strong enough to win.⁷⁰

The fourth major goal of terrorism is to aggravate relations between states or allies so as to bring about a set of political events favorable to the terrorist group.⁷¹

The fifth goal of terrorism is to free prisoners or to secure monetary ransoms.⁷²

Each of these terrorist goals may be politically motivated and thus is of concern to the military.

TERRORIST METHODS

Just as a terrorist group may have more than one objective, they can use more than one tactic to achieve their goals. The most common ones are presented here for comparison.

Assassination is one of the techniques that terrorists use. It is the killing of a prominent person or symbolic enemy.⁷³ The goal may not be to dispose of the individual target as much as it is to show weakness and vulnerability of the victims' institution. Assassination is also widely used against traitors who defect from the group to deliver a message to current members regarding loyalty.

Bombing is another terrorist tactic that is rapidly becoming their most popular tool. The improved explosive devise (IED) is the contemporary terrorists weapon of

choice. IED's can be very cheap to produce, and because of advanced detonation technology, are of low risk to the terrorist. Bombs have a great attention getting capability and casualty control is easy through placement and time of detonation. Bombs are easily denied if the expected result is not obtained. From 1983 to 1990, one half of terrorist incidents used bombs.⁷⁴

Hostage taking, the overt seizure of people to gain publicity or concessions in return for release of the hostages, is a very dramatic terrorist technique. This technique, however, provides one of the highest risks to the terrorist.⁷⁵

Kidnapping, unlike hostage taking, is the covert seizure of person(s) in order to extract specific demands. Identity of the perpetrators is easily concealed for a long time and media coverage will be initially intense, but will fade over time. Kidnapping requires detailed planning and logistical support for the terrorist.⁷⁶

Sabotage is a terrorist method designed to demonstrate the vulnerability of a society to terrorist actions. Industrialized societies are much more vulnerable to sabotage than non-industrialized societies because of the interdependence of utilities, transportation, and communications. Sabotage is low risk for the terrorist and can get great public attention due to disruption of services.

TERRORIST TARGET SECTION

Terrorists collect information on many different targets before selecting the one they will attack. After the information is collected, they use the information and weigh it against their target criteria to determine which target will best accomplish the group's goals. Typically, they will use some, if not all the of the following criteria.⁷⁷

The first criteria is the criticality of the target. This criteria assesses the impact of the target on the terrorist's adversary and on the target audience. It is the first criteria considered and it will determine whether the risk of the attack is worth the potential gain in publicity and prestige toward the terrorist's ultimate goals.⁷⁸

The second criteria that the terrorist uses is the accessibility of the target. It answers the question of whether the tactical cell members can access the target without being detected and subsequently complete their mission successfully.⁷⁹

The third criteria that the terrorist must weigh is the recoverability of the target. This assessment considers how long the target will be disrupted, or out of action as a result of a successful attack using means available to the organization.⁸⁰

The fourth criteria that the terrorist must consider is the vulnerability of the target. This assessment determines what means would be required to disrupt or destroy the target and allows the terrorist to determine if he has the means to do enough damage to make the target worthwhile.⁸¹

The fifth criteria considered is the effect of the attack on the terrorist group itself. The terrorist must determine if the attack will actually bolster his stated cause, or if the potential backlash could actually have a negative effect on the terrorist groups' goals.⁸²

The sixth, and final criteria that the terrorist group employs is the risk to the terrorist himself. This addresses the probability of the tactical cell members being able to escape after the attack has been completed. This is not always an important consideration, as some terrorists are willing to die for their cause, and in some cases want

to be martyrs. It is important to note that this is the least important and last criteria considered.⁸³

TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION METHODS

Terrorists, unlike law enforcement officials or security elements, are not constrained by the law or ethics when collecting information. They can plant covert listening devices (bugs), torture people who have needed information, or conduct surveillance on potential targets until they get the information that they need for their purposes.⁸⁴ Terrorists use five basic means of information collection.

Open source information is one of the easiest and quickest methods for a terrorist to collect needed information. This means includes the local newspapers, news magazines, television, radio, and the Internet. This collection method is particularly easy in an open society like the United States due to the Freedom of Information Act. Terrorist groups take advantage of this Act to collect information on the activities of key organizations, high level leaders and even security precautions of major buildings which are typically available and present tempting targets. In an open society, the terrorists' problem may not be obtaining information, but sifting through the vast amount of it.⁸⁵

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection is another easy, although a somewhat slower collection method. HUMINT includes talking with employees of potential targets by compromising them or simply engaging them in casual "bar conversation". A more extreme form of HUMINT may be to kidnap and torture victims with specific information. HUMINT can also be collected by both active and passive terrorist supporters which may include disgruntled government workers or private citizens with

access to government information. Still another, more risky method is to infiltrate a terrorist into an company that provides services (cleaning, food service) to the target organization.⁸⁶

Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) collection is a method that can provide very timely and accurate technical means with which a terrorist can monitor telephone or radio traffic. Although it may be difficult to access telephone information on some targets, most modern security forces use a radio network to coordinate their security efforts. These radio networks are generally not secured by cryptographic equipment and can be easily monitored by a simple scanner. This ability allows terrorists to monitor the security practices of a target prior to an attack to establish routines and during the attack itself.⁸⁷

Target surveillance is perhaps the easiest and most universally available collection method for the terrorist. The terrorist simply watches the facilities and personnel around the target by pedestrian or vehicular methods. In larger terrorist groups, the surveillance will be conducted by the intelligence cell who only collate and process the information. In smaller organizations, the surveillant may be the same persons conducting the attack.⁸⁸

Photographic Intelligence (PHOTINT) collection is used extensively by terrorists for two reasons. First, the terrorist has a record of the target for use during the target selection process, and second, if the terrorist organization is large enough to have independent cells, the photo can be used to help the tactical cell learn about the target.⁸⁹

Although photographing a target can add to the risks of intelligence collection, the gain for having a photo generally outweighs the risk.

SECTION II CONCLUSION

Terrorism is not senseless, mindless, or irrational. On the contrary, it is truly a deliberate means to a specific end. It has an uncanny ability to bring the political agenda of the terrorist group to the forefront of a society with a good chance of success.

Terrorist organizations are well organized and disciplined, much like any modern day army. They have vast resources which they can call upon to accomplish their intentions, and they are not constrained by the moral or legal aspects of war. They have a wide variety of methods with which to attack, from assassination to bombing. Like any good military force, they conduct target analysis to insure that their political aim is met and employ coordinated information collection in order to achieve their goals. They have the ability to employ irregular forces in a manner which is very difficult to defend against, and enjoy a wide variety of targets to select from.

As long as the United States Army retains its position as the strongest army in the world, and the U.S. remains a world leader, few forces, in any, can match it on the conventional battlefield. As a result, political powers will continue to use the cost-effectiveness of terrorism to make their political agendas known to the United States and the world. Terrorism is a formidable threat which the United States Army must prepare to face.

III. EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, wars have been fought by nations or nation-states on a defined battlefield with specific goals under the constraints of given rules of warfare. Today, however, the United States is increasingly involved in Peace Operations where the delineation of sides is not as clear. Due to the military power that the U.S. brings into a conflict, it is often impossible for an opponent to wage war directly against it.

In such cases, terrorism is a tempting method of war to wage against the U.S. This brings into play the concept of the "extended battlefield". For the purposes of this monograph, the extended battlefield will be defined as acts of violence not specifically directed at a military force involved in the conflict, but at the populace and government which supports that military force or political policy⁹⁰ although the military element may be the immediate victim. The goal is thus to apply pressure to the government of the military to change policy through unrest within its own population.

This chapter will explore two historical case studies in which terrorism was used in the expanded battlefield to influence the policies of government. "...Countries are obliged to fight where their interests demand that they should, and this is not necessarily along their geographic frontiers."⁹¹

NORTHERN IRELAND CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND

The conflict in Northern Ireland is deeply rooted between the Catholic and Protestants and began in the 17th century with the English and Scottish settlement in

Ulster. This conflict has passed down from generation to generation ever since and has been translated into a struggle for power between the two communities.⁹²

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) dates to World War I and was key in the 1916 Easter Rising which lasted for six days and the subsequent full scale rebellion which lasted until 1920. Its guerrilla tactics and terrorism were instrumental in forcing the British government to compromise on the Ireland situation, which led to the British proposal to partition Ireland. In 1921, the agreed upon partition ended the two year Civil War.⁹³ The 1921 agreement provided for an independent Ireland, but left the nation divided as it contained only 26 of the 32 counties. The Irish Republic (South) was left predominately Catholic and Northern Ireland predominantly Protestant.⁹⁴

In Northern Ireland, the Catholics were unskilled and untrained for employment which left a rift between the Protestants and Catholics along economic and social boundaries. The Catholics claimed discrimination in justice and housing as well as unequal representation in local elections. This division, along with the unemployed and disenchanted youth, fueled the IRA's desire for unification of the island.⁹⁵

Conditions of economic stagnation, political and social deprivation and boredom among teenagers increased the climate and probability of violence. The violence reflected the adventurism of the youth and resulted in actions against the Protestants, the local police force and British soldiers. Rioting became a form of entertainment; the search for action and lust for guns provided great numbers of recruiting possibilities for the IRA. The focus of the IRA and the British government was the Urban areas, where most unrest occurred.⁹⁶

Terrorism, as a primary tool for the IRA, began in mid 1969 as a result of increased communal unrest. By this time, the IRA was highly disciplined, well organized, and even more fanatically dedicated to unification of the island of Ireland.⁹⁷

The goal of terrorism in Northern Ireland was to simply make the province ungovernable to British forces. The IRA's methods were to disrupt daily life and law and order, which would lead to the evacuation of British forces and allow unification of the Island. Terrorism was employed against British troops, rival groups, and those of its own which appeared to support British occupation. Their intent was to drive a wedge between British forces and make it appear that only IRA could provide protection.

EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD - NORTHERN IRELAND

Although the IRA was successful in disrupting life in Northern Ireland, their goal of unification was not achieved. Because of their fanatical belief in unification, they were willing to extend the battlefield to the heart of Great Britain itself.

At 2:45 am on October 13, 1984, the IRA conducted a bombing at the Grand Hotel in Brighton in an attempt to kill the Prime Minister and the majority of the British Cabinet who were staying there while attending the Annual Conservative Party Conference. When the blast occurred, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, was in her suite working on her keynote speech to the following days conference. Investigation after the explosion showed that the bathroom, which Mrs. Thatcher had just left, was wrecked by the blast with windows and mirrors shattered. Following the explosion, Mrs. Thatcher and other members of the Cabinet were evacuated through a rear entrance to the hotel and taken to the Brighton Police Station for protection and

medical treatment.⁹⁸ Mr. Norman Tibbet, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, was the most senior British official injured among the thirty injured and two killed.⁹⁹

The bomb, which detonated in a fifth story front facing room of the eight story 178 room hotel, was claimed by the IRA at 11:20 am the same day in a statement given to the Press Association in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The head of Scotland Yard's antiterrorism squad said the bomb, which was time detonated, may have been planted weeks earlier by IRA terrorists and wrapped in plastic to prevent detection by search dogs.¹⁰⁰

The IRA's statement said they had detonated a 100 pound gelatin bomb "against the British Cabinet and the Tory war mongers", and further said that "Thatcher will now realize that Britain cannot occupy our country, torture our prisoners and shoot our people in their own streets and get away with it".¹⁰¹

CONCLUSION - NORTHERN IRELAND

This example of the expanded battlefield is an example of the extreme to which a dedicated terrorist organization will go. Although the IRA's long term goal of unification of Ireland was not met, the attack was successful in the following aspects.

First, as the IRA claimed, it exploded the myth of the impregnable United Kingdom Government¹⁰². This IRA claim was supported by initial condemnation for lack of proper security around the sight, and the fact that the government officials were kept together to make a lucrative target.¹⁰³ Equally important, despite all of the security measure that were used, the IRA was able to conduct the attack, which demonstrated the weakness of the British Government by indicating that if the government cannot protect

its own elite, it probably cannot protect the average British citizen. The British government officially conceded its weakness against terrorist tactics: in an official statement it said "total security is impossible in a free, democratic society. Political and other leaders are vulnerable because they must be accessible."¹⁰⁴

Second, the attack was a dramatic success because it forced the Northern Ireland issue to the forefront of the British political agenda. Politicians both in Great Britain and Ireland swiftly emphasized that it would "bring the governments in Dublin and London closer in their search for political progress in Northern Ireland."¹⁰⁵

ALGERIA CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND

The conflict between Algeria and France is deeply ingrained between the two countries along political, religious and social lines. Its roots date back to the 1830 annexation of Algeria by France and has continued to today.

The "current" round of conflict, began in the mid-1950's as an anti-colonial movement among the Muslim majority in Algeria. In the 1950's Algeria's capital, Algiers, was predominately ruled by the French Colonists (Colons) who were the minority but held most of the wealth and political power. The diverse inequality between the two cultures was fueled by the unwillingness of the Colons to accept the native Algerians into the elite upper-society.¹⁰⁶

The first nationalistic uprising began in 1947 under the leadership of Messali Hadj through one of his nationalist groups, the Secret Organization (SO). The SO trained and armed for combat against the French but were quickly destroyed by the vastly

superior French forces. Although beaten, the members remained in contact and in 1954 re-emerged as the National Liberation Front (FLN) and began widespread violence all over Algeria.¹⁰⁷

By 1956 the National Liberation Front was a very sophisticated organization. They used the hierarchical structure with specialized cells formed to carry out specifically assigned functions such as supply, finance, intelligence and tactics which remained compartmented for security.¹⁰⁸

The focus of the FLN was to emphasize the role of the armed struggle against the French and to show that only through military victory could Algeria gain its independence. The FLN had several goals to accomplish in Algiers. The first was to demonstrate the inability of France to establish peace in the country; the second was to demoralize the French people; the third was to alienate the population from France; the fourth was to reinforce the psychological mobilization of the population against France; and the last was to show the rest of the world the national solidarity against continued French control.¹⁰⁹ Through a campaign of sabotage and assassination, terrorism was a key tool for the FLN to produce psychological effect and bring their cause to the forefront of international attention.¹¹⁰

The FLN was able to gain admiration among Algerian Muslims and provoke harsh government reprisals that alienated the masses.¹¹¹ Part of the reprisals that the French used was the deployment of French paratroopers to Algeria who required only a short time to destroy the FLN.¹¹² Although the FLN was defeated on the tactical level, the methods the French used were extremely violent themselves.¹¹³ In 1961, the politics

of the war torn Algeria fostered a coup attempt by French army officials determined to keep Algeria French. Only through efforts of French General Charles DeGaulle did the coup fail, and ultimately even he saw the futility of continued control of Algeria and granted Algerian independence in 1962.¹¹⁴

Algerian independence saw most Colons depart Algeria for France. Along with the Colons, many Muslims also migrated to France for fear of retribution from the FLN once in power. This exodus of the French took most skilled workers from Algeria and set the stage for rival factions to begin working against one another for power.

EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD - ALGERIA

Although guerrilla war, terrorist tactics, and civil unrest finally brought independence to Algeria, fulfilling her nationalistic hopes, its independence has been plagued with internal social, religious and economic strife. Due to the close ethnic and economic ties, France has continued to be involved in Algerian affairs. In 1995 France provided approximately one-billion dollars in loans and grants to the Algerian government and arranged credit for Algeria from the International Monetary Fund in 1994. Additionally, France imports nearly one-billion dollars worth of natural gas from Algeria annually.¹¹⁵

The most recent round of conflict between Algeria and France began in 1992. From the end of 1991 through 1992, a coalition of Islamic leaders under the name of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the most powerful political group in Algeria. This Islamic fundamentalist group was feared by the Algerian government in power, as well as

by the French, who did not want a fundamentalist state like Libya or Iran across the Mediterranean.¹¹⁶

Prior to the 1992 election, which the FIS was poised to win, a military regime took control of the government and canceled the elections. These actions by the government sparked another civil war in Algeria. The government then began a systematic campaign against fundamentalism. In response to government actions, fundamentalists began to target French citizens, as well as other foreigners in Algeria to demand that France cut off foreign aid to the Algerian government. The French authorities refused to bow to terrorist pressures in Algeria and continued the aid to the Algerian government. The French viewed aid as the only way to stabilize Algeria and prevent an influx of immigrants from that country, although they urged the military government to be moderate in their dealings with the opposition.

On July 25, 1995, in response to French inaction, terrorist bombing began in France. Initially the French accused French Muslim sympathizers within France as the source of the attacks and initiated a crackdown by police empowered to demand identification papers from anyone they thought suspicious. These actions resulted in the deportation of several dozen Algerians and served to further embitter the nearly 5 million Muslims living in France.¹¹⁷

On October 7, 1995, Algeria's Armed Islamic Group (GIA) claimed responsibility for the terrorist bombing campaign that rocked France. In a communiqué sent to Western News Agency in Cairo, Egypt, dated September 23, 1995, the GIA said the campaign was to punish France for supporting the Algeria government. An excerpt from the

communiqué said: "We are continuing with all our strength our steps of Holy War and military attacks, and this time in the heart of France and its largest cities...it is a pledge that they [the French] will have no more sleep and no more leisure and Islam will enter whether they like it or not."¹¹⁸

On October 17, 1995, a terrorist bomb exploded on an underground commuter train in Paris. The bomb was made from a gas canister (camping type) packed with explosives and nuts and bolts and fit the pattern of earlier GIA bombing. The blast wounded 29 people. This attack forced France to confront the serious, continuing domestic threat from Algerian internal strife and face the fact that the bombings were part of a larger organized network.¹¹⁹

The police believed that the bombings were being conducted by ethnic Muslims recruited from the ghettos around major French cities where millions of French-Algerians and Muslims fled after the 1962 independence.¹²⁰ These ghettos made a lucrative recruiting ground which were further encouraged by French police harassment over the previous months.

The October 17 bombing set off a national alarm that confirmed that France faced a formidable campaign by Islamic Algerians determined to bring their ongoing civil war to the former mother country. The attack was apparently in response to a GIA warning that French President Jacques Chirac not meet with Algerian President Liamine Zeroual at the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, a warning which Chirac ignored.

CONCLUSIONS - ALGERIA

This example of the extended battlefield indicates how a foreign power can attempt to change the foreign policy of a nation through terrorism on the home front. In this case study, France was singled out because of its long colonial and financial ties with Algeria, its support for the Algerian government and the deep resentment over police harassment of hundreds of thousands of Algerians living in the ghettos of Paris and other major cities.¹²¹ The terrorist bombing campaign in France was a success for the GIA in three aspects.

First, the people of France had to live in a constant fear of terrorism. This is confirmed by a statement by Prime Minister Alain Juppe on October 17, "Our fellow citizens are taken hostage in their daily lives, on their way to work, in school, and in the market places".¹²²

Second, the terrorist bombings forced France to commit a great number of assets to prevent further terrorist attacks. French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debre said, "the government has mobilized like never before, adding 12,000 police officers and 2500 soldiers to patrol train stations, streets and borders".¹²³ Not only did this commitment of resources cost a great deal of money, it further heightens the siege mentality of the population.

Third, and foremost, these terrorist attacks immediately brought the agenda of the Islamic Fundamentalist to the forefront of the French foreign policy agenda.

SECTION III CONCLUSIONS

This chapter clearly shows how the extended battlefield affected both Great Britain and France. In each case, the terrorist groups demonstrated how terrorism could be used to further their cause. In both instances, terrorism was used effectively when no other means was available.

Both the IRA and the GIA demonstrate the willingness and capability to strike at the heart of their opponents, even through heightened security. Their organization and planning were instrumental to their ability to establish or bring to the front their political agenda.

Although in neither case was the target military, nor were the ultimate goal of the terrorist organization realized, these incidents do indicate how a dedicated terrorist can extend the battlefield beyond the expected realm at a time when there is no declared war. These case studies show that the economy of force of terrorism is effective in achieving intermediate goals on the political level and that all potential targets must be prepared to address the terrorist threat.

IV. TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Terrorist attacks against military targets are rarely military in nature. They are typically directed at the political policy of the target nation in an attempt to damage national prestige or posture or to sway the political decision making of that country.¹²⁴

United States interests are targets of terrorism for a variety of reasons. Many nations and powers harbor animosity against the U.S. because of ideological differences, the fact that the U.S. is a leading industrial power, or the fact that the U.S. is a leading capitalist state. Another powerful reason to target U.S. interests with terrorism is that some perceive that the U.S. can dictate the actions of other independent nations due to its relative strength. Whatever the reason, U.S. personnel and interests provide a viable target because of their mere presence - U.S. personnel are everywhere.¹²⁵

The U.S. policy on terrorism dictates that all terrorist actions are criminal and intolerable, regardless of motivation and should be condemned. Further, it states that all lawful measures to prevent terrorist acts and bring to justice those who commit them should be taken and that no concessions to terrorists blackmail should be made.¹²⁶

Although the U.S. takes a hard line on terrorism, the reasons that make U.S. interests a target remain because U.S. military forces make an inviting target for terrorists interested in dictating U.S. foreign policy. "Terrorists attack targets which are vulnerable, have high psychological impact on society, produce significant publicity"¹²⁷ and contribute to the perceived weakness of a nation.¹²⁸

This chapter will examine two case studies where U.S. military forces were terrorist targets and determine the significance of the terrorist attacks on U.S. foreign policy.

BEIRUT CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND

In the early 1980's Lebanon was a small weak state in a region of great tension and conflict "beset with virtually every unresolved dispute afflicting the peoples of the Middle East". Its government was "multi-confessional", which is to say that it was made deliberately weak to accommodate the different and diverse religious factions in the nation in an attempt to provide some type of government.¹²⁹

For the most part, Lebanon was a battleground for Syrians and the Israelis to conduct an indirect war with each other; in essence, Lebanon had become a battleground where armed Lebanese factions simultaneously manipulated and were manipulated by the foreign forces around them.¹³⁰

U.S. INVOLVEMENT

On June 6, 1982, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), in an effort to destroy PLO elements, invaded Lebanon and within three days had rolled-up the PLO from the border to the outskirts of the capital of Beirut.¹³¹ In response, the U.S. deployed a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) off the coast of Lebanon and on June 23, 1982, and conducted a successful non-combatant evacuation (NEO) operation of U.S. citizens from the port of city of Joniyah.¹³²

On July 2, 1982, the IDF instituted a blockade of Beirut. As a result, a Multi-National Force (MNF) was formed consisting of French and Italian forces and the MAU. This MNF evacuated some 15,000 armed Palestinians and Syrians from Beirut to prevent

the IDF from destroying the city with a military attack. The MNF completed its mission successfully and was withdrawn by September 10, 1982.¹³³

Within a week, events in Lebanon escalated. On September 14 the Lebanese President-elect Bachir Gemaer was assassinated and Christian-IDF forces massacred some 800 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in refugee camps. These actions brought about the reconstitution of the MNF, and by September 29th the MNF had reentered Beirut.¹³⁴

The mission of the MAU (USMNF) was “to establish an environment suitable for withdrawal of foreign military forces and assist the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in establishing security against Beirut.”¹³⁵ It was perceived that the USMNF would be received among the Lebanese factions as “even-handed and neutral” and the MAU was warmly welcomed and seemed to be appreciated by most Lebanese.¹³⁶

The USMNF sector was the Beirut International Airport (BIA). Politically, if the BIA remained open it signaled that Lebanon was a functioning country.¹³⁷ Although tactically unwise, this meant that the Marines would have to co-exist with civilians operating and flowing through the BIA.

By March 1983, the friendly environment began to change for the worse. A USMNF patrol was attacked by a hand grenade, wounding five Marines, and both the French and Italian MNF forces had similar incidents.

The most significant indicator of the change in environment was the April 18 bombing of the U.S. Embassy. The explosion destroyed the Embassy, killing 17

Americans and 60 others. The method of attack was a light truck packed with a "gas enhanced" explosive that produced an unprecedented explosion.¹³⁸

During this period the mission of the Marines also escalated. They provided training, ammunition resupply and naval gunfire to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). These additional tasks expanded beyond their original peacekeeping mission and represented a shift from their initial neutrality.

From April until October hostile incidents directed at the USMNF increased. In late July the BIA began receiving unintentional shelling from clashes between the LAF and factional militias, and in early August, the BIA received the first intentional shelling from factional forces.¹³⁹ From 14-16 October, two Marines were killed on the BIA perimeter in sniper incidents.¹⁴⁰ On October 19, four Marines were wounded when a MAU convoy was attacked by a car bomb.¹⁴¹ By this time the situation in Lebanon had clearly turned hostile to the USMNF, and as a result, the Marines consolidated their positions in the USMNF headquarters building.

On October 23, 1983, the hostilities toward the MNF reached their peak. At approximately 06:22 a.m., a large yellow Mercedes-Benz stakebed truck containing over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed the gate of the BIA, "drove over barbed wire, between two checkpoints (without being engaged), entered an open gate, passed around a barrier, flattened the sergeant of the guards booth and penetrated the lobby of the MAU headquarters and exploded."¹⁴² As a result of the blast the building was destroyed and 241 Marines were killed with over 100 wounded.

Almost simultaneously with the attack on the USMNF, another, similar truck bombs exploded at the French MNF Headquarters.¹⁴³

AFTERMATH - BEIRUT

Clearly, the immediate victims of the terrorist attack were the Marines themselves. The real target of the attack, however, was the U.S. Congress and the American people.¹⁴⁴ The Lebanese terrorists had followed the public debates in the U.S. concerning the Marine deployment to Beirut and understood that a lot of casualties would undermine the weak legislative support for the administration.¹⁴⁵

Following the bombing, the Secretary of Defense convened the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport (BIA) Terrorist Act of 23 October 1983 (Long Commission). The Long Commission found that the USMNF was not trained, organized, staffed or supported to deal with the terrorist threat in Lebanon.¹⁴⁶ As a result, the USMNF commander was unable to process or act upon the more than 100 intelligence reports warning of terrorist carbomb attacks received between May 1983 and November 1983.¹⁴⁷ The Long Commission also determined that putting so many of the forces in one barracks made it a lucrative target.¹⁴⁸

In addition to these findings, the Long Commission discovered that at 05:00 a.m. on the morning of the attack a guard post sentry spotted suspicious activity by a yellow Mercedes Benz truck in a parking lot near the USMNF headquarters, but did not report the incident because the truck did not park. This truck is believed to be the same one used during the attack at 06:22 a.m.¹⁴⁹

Although it was clear that the USMNF was not prepared for such an attack due to inadequate staffing, procedures and changes in environment compared to the mission, the Long Report held that "military commanders are responsible for the security of their subordinates".¹⁵⁰

CONCLUSIONS - BEIRUT

The Beirut attack was not military in nature because the Marines were not combatants.¹⁵¹ Those who perpetrated the attack against the Americans and Western presence in Lebanon understood that the battleground was not in Lebanon, but in the United States.¹⁵²

The terrorist's strategy was to generate enough casualties to persuade the U.S., and therefor the entire MNF, to withdraw from Lebanon. Their strategy was successful. On February 8, 1984, President Regan announced the re-deployment of the marines to ships off the Lebanon coast.¹⁵³

The decision to pull the Marines from Lebanon resulted primarily from Congressional disapproval, inability of the Administration to articulate a consistent policy, and the fact that 1984 was an election year.¹⁵⁴ The withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon is one of the most impressive examples of terrorist influence on government policy.¹⁵⁵

Had the security post Marine guard who spotted the yellow truck at 05:00 a.m. been trained to observe the suspicious activity of the truck as a terrorist threat and report the incident, the USMNF could have heightened security around its headquarters. Increased security could possibly have thwarted the attack, saved 241 lives and prevented

the achievement of the terrorist's goals. Though no fault of the guard on duty, this lack of training contributed to the terrorist's success.

SAUDI ARABIA CASE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the August 2, 1990 attack into Kuwait by Iraq, The U.S. was generally welcomed by Saudi Arabia, but the U.S. presence was preferred to be "over the horizon." Thus, most of the U.S. military presence was through the Middle East Force operating in the Arabian Gulf.¹⁵⁶

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. led a coalition of Western and Islamic forces to defend Saudi Arabia, as well as other smaller Gulf states, and to free Kuwait from Iraq's occupation. The coalition subsequently won an impressive victory over Iraq, but all of the threats to the region were not destroyed.¹⁵⁷ In addition to the freeing of Kuwait, the U.S. vital interests of protecting the vast energy resources in the Gulf region remained.

Although Iraqi forces were forced out of Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein remained in power as a threat to the gulf region. To help deter further aggression by Hussein, the U.S. has remained in Saudi Arabia to insure enforcement of United Nations (UN) resolutions imposed on Iraq. One part of the UN Resolutions was the establishment of a "no-fly zone" along the 32 degree parallel which prohibits Iraqi aircraft from threatening its neighbors to the south. This operation, know as Southern Watch, is manned by nearly 5,000 United States Air Force personnel who conduct

combat air missions from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to enforce the "no-fly zone" over Iraq.¹⁵⁸

Until recently, terrorism in Saudi Arabia was improbable, however, Islamic fundamental forces from Iran and Iraq, as well as dissidents within Saudi Arabia itself have changed the relative safety of that country. Since the Gulf War, westernization in the Saudi Kingdom has further inflamed fundamentalist issues, putting pressure on King Fahd to renounce western influence.¹⁵⁹ Some of those opposition forces have turned to terrorism.

The first terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia directed against U.S. personnel occurred in 1991. In that incident, terrorists attacked a bus in Jeddah and wounded three U.S. Airmen. The perpetrators of that attack were subsequently captured by Saudi officials and executed.¹⁶⁰

The Second terrorist attack in the Saudi Kingdom occurred on November 13, 1995. It occurred at 11:40 a.m. near a downtown Riyadh snack bar frequented by U.S. personnel who ran a military training center for the Saudi National Guard. The terrorists used a van packed with explosives that detonated outside the snack bar. The explosion killed five Americans and wounded 60 others.¹⁶¹ Four Sunni Muslims were captured following the attack and later confessed to the bombings. They were beheaded on May 31, 1996.¹⁶²

KHOBAR TOWER ATTACK

Members of the 4404th Air Wing (Provisional) were housed in the Khobar Towers. The 4404th Air Wing was the Air Force unit with the responsibility of

monitoring the Iraqi “no-fly zone”. The facility housed approximately 3,000 U.S. military personnel, as well as military personnel from the United Kingdom, France and Saudi Arabia. It had been used to house the U.S. personnel since 1991.¹⁶³

Shortly before 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, a fuel truck approached the northern perimeter fence of the Khobar compound and parked. Within a few minutes the truck exploded, destroying the building closest to the perimeter fence that housed U.S. Airmen. Nineteen U.S. Airmen were killed and 547 were injured in the blast.¹⁶⁴

AFTERMATH - SAUDI ARABIA

There were many repercussions from the terrorist attack in Dhahran. One of the first was the severe criticism of Secretary of Defense William Perry, CJCS General John Shalikashvili, the Department of Defense, and all leadership in the chain of command. There was a general feeling of distrust for military leadership.¹⁶⁵ Senator Strom Thurmon, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, referring to previous attacks said, “Average Americans would think that we had learned something from these incidents about protecting our forces and progressed beyond the point at which we find ourselves today.”¹⁶⁶

Another repercussion was the loss of prestige of the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. The logical conclusion to the fact that U.S. military could not protect its own forces in Saudi Arabia, then what capability would they have to protect the countries they are there to defend? This perceived weakness was further exasperated by the almost immediate plan to move of U.S. forces to a secluded base sixty miles from Riyadh; a move that could be viewed as a retreat in the face of a terrorist threat.

To further embarrass the U.S. military, security measures became suspect when initial reports of the incident indicated that a suspicious truck attempted to enter the compound at approximately noon on the day of the blast, but was turned away. This truck is believed to be the same truck that delivered the explosives to the blast site near the perimeter fence ten hours later.¹⁶⁷

CONCLUSIONS - SAUDI ARABIA

The goal of the terrorist attack at Khobar Towers was to attain the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. Although the U.S. did not conduct the withdrawal that the terrorist hoped for, the attack was partially successful.

One of the major goals of terrorism is to "aggravate relations between states so as to bring about a set of political events favorable to the terrorist group."¹⁶⁸ To this goal the attack was successful. The attack placed a great deal of strain on the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia because the U.S. asserted that the Saudi government was uncooperative in attempts to heighten security around the target and the U.S. instead demanded that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) be allowed to assist in the investigation. Coordinating civil and military affairs is extremely difficult with allies. The host nation has to remain the allegiance of its own population and not have the guest undermine the legitimacy of the host government.¹⁶⁹ The attack placed both governments in a precarious diplomatic situation.

Another major goal of terrorism is "coercive diplomacy", which is the deprivation of resources and piece of mind.¹⁷⁰ To this goal also the attack was a success. The cost of moving the U.S. soldiers to a safer location is estimated to be \$200 million, which the

U.S. and Saudi government have agreed to share.¹⁷¹ It is also obvious that any piece of mind that the U.S. forces had about the security in Saudi Arabia was shattered in the attack.

Just as important as the loss of peace of mind by U.S. forces was the loss of confidence in military leadership by the American people due the similarities between this attack and the Beirut attack; the American people expect the military leadership to learn from its mistakes. Although the truck was turned away when it attempted to gain access to the Khobar compound at noon, the driver was able to return ten hours later and conduct the attack by parking beside a fence near the U.S. Air Force barracks. Had the security personnel on duty at noon been trained to observe the threat of the truck for its full potential, lifesaving security measures could have been taken during the ten hours between the first encounter and the explosion. Just as in Beirut, this training could potentially have saved lives and U.S. prestige.

SECTION IV CONCLUSIONS

Today, the United States has the most powerful military in the world. Through these two case studies, however, it is evident that this disperse correlation of power can be reduced by a terrorist act. Within three months of the attack on the U.S. Marines in Beirut the ultimate goal of the terrorist was achieved. The results of the terrorist attack in Dhahran were not as successful, but it did aggravate the U.S. - Saudi alliance, cost both governments millions of dollars, and shook the confidence of all U.S. forces deployed in the Middle East, if not the rest of the world.

Most importantly, in each case there were signs which, if recognized could have been used to prevent loss of life and security of U.S. national policy.

Although neither of these cases involved the U.S. Army, the fact that the Army has not been targeted is only chance. The Army's involvement in peacekeeping operations throughout the world provides terrorists with opportunities like Beirut and Saudi Arabia on a daily basis. Just as in these cases, an attack on Army personnel or facilities could have a dramatic strategic impact on U.S. foreign policy, which makes antiterrorism training imperative for U.S. soldiers.

V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION

ANALYSIS

Terrorism is a formidable threat to United States' military and policies. It is a cost effective means for a group to bring its political agenda to the forefront of American society.

The case studies of Northern Ireland and the Algeria serve to show that the competence and determination of terrorist groups can be extremely effective, even against heightened security. Additionally, they indicate that there is little to counter terrorism at the point of attack.

The case studies of Beirut and Dhahran show that, unlike the conventional battlefield, mass forces and superior firepower cannot defeat a terrorist threat. In fact, massing forces in both cases proved counter-productive. Conventional mind-set and tactics cannot defeat the determined terrorist threat.

In Beirut the Marines were under constant attack from factional forces. This constant threat distracted both commanders and Marines alike from what would become their greatest threat - terrorism. They did not have the ability to focus on intelligence reports concerning terrorism, and were not trained to observe their environment to determine and report the threat. In contrast to Beirut, the environment of Dhahran was safe, lacking an immediate threat. In spite of the two previous terrorist attacks, this environment was ripe for complacency as the location had been used to house U.S. personnel for over five years without incident.

In both Beirut and Dhahran, the vehicles that conducted the attacks were either sighted or confronted prior to the actual attack, but no action was taken to respond to the threat with heightened security. These "last minute" sightings are only two examples of missed opportunities and are hardly the only chances that would have been available to identify the threat to the trained observer. They do, however, illustrate that both attacks had positive warning signs that went unrecognized; in both cases, personnel were unable to "see the trees for the forest".

To defeat terrorism, personnel must "see" his surroundings, link what he sees to the terrorist threat, and report that threat to the proper authorities *before* the attack occurs. He must have the ability to "distinguish the trees from the forest" regarding a terrorist threat.

The Army is, and will continue to be involved with missions in environments from ones like Beirut to ones like Dhahran. To insure that Army personnel do not become victims of a major terrorist attack, the Army must train individual soldiers to

“see” his surroundings, link what he sees to a specific threat, and report that threat to the proper authorities. Currently the Army has no doctrine with which to train soldiers to “distinguish the trees from the forest” regarding a terrorist threat.

RECOMMENDATION

Army commanders are responsible to implement the policy of the United States and to protect the soldiers within their commands. Although the Army has not yet been the target of a major terrorist attack, terrorist attacks have been able to both undermine U.S. policy and kill military personnel. As such, the Army position on terrorism should not be one of “if” it will be targeted, but “when” and should develop a Personal Protection Doctrine to prepare soldiers to recognize terrorist methods and report suspicious activities to authorities. Intelligence organizations cannot do it all. The Army must integrate its soldiers into the fight against terrorism before it is too late.

ENDNOTES

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² Ibid., VI.

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⁴ F. J. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies, (NY: Norton, 1977), IX.

⁵ Vetter, 30.

⁶ FM 100-37, VI.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Vetter, 30-36.

⁹ Department of Defense. Directive 0-2000.12-H. Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Public Turbulence, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), A-1.

¹⁰ The U.S. has experienced several terrorist attacks from within its own population. The 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal building and the 1996 bombing in the Centennial Park during the 1996 Olympics have been attributed to United States citizens. These terrorist attacks, although not perpetrated by a foreign agent, are of no less concern to the United States military forces than an event that was conducted by a foreigner.

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¹² U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), G-3.

¹³ Based on a review of U. S. Army Field Manuals 100-23, 71-100, 100-15 and 100-5.

¹⁴ U.S. Army, Regulation 525-13 The Army Combating Terrorism Program, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1992), 3.

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¹⁶ U. S. Marine Corps, FMFM 7-14 Combating Terrorism, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1990), 3-1.

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²⁰ K. Seger, The Antiterrorism Handbook, (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1990), 87.

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²² E. Wheeler, "Terrorism and Military Theory: An Historical Perspective" in Terrorism Research and Public Policy, ed C. McCauley, (Portland, Or.: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1991), 7.

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²⁴ JP 3-07.2, I-1.

²⁵ G. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, (NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 16.

²⁶ JP 1-02, 97.

²⁷ Joint Pub JP 3-07.2, I-1.

²⁸ JP 1-02, 30.

²⁹ Ibid.

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³² Wardlaw, 17.

³³ D. Vought, "The Coming Age of Terror" in Security Intelligence Sourcebook, ed F. McGuire, (Silver Spring, Md.: Interests, Ltd, 1993), 16.

³⁴ Wardlaw, 8.

³⁵ JP 3-07.2, II-3 - II-4.

³⁶ JP 3-07.2, II-4.

³⁷ Hacker, 8-34.

³⁸ Vetter, 5; Hacker, 8-34.

³⁹ Wardlaw, XI.

⁴⁰ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 69.

⁴¹ Vought, 15.

⁴² FMFM 7-14, 1-1.

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⁴⁵ Vought, 15.

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⁵⁰ Crenshaw, 24.

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⁸⁸ Ibid., 85-86.

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